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RECENT MARKET EVENTS AND THE
FOUNDATION FOR GLOBAL MARKET CRISES:
A LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE*
Philip H. Harris**

I am afraid that you have all been deceived a bit if you expect
that I will be discussing Long-Term Capital Management

("LTCM").1 It was an entirely private transaction and ethical
* This speech was originally presented at the Derivatives and Risk
Management Symposium on Stability in World Financial Markets, held at
Fordham University School of Law on January 28, 1999.
** Partner, Investment Product Group, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher &
Flom LLP. Mr. Harris served as Lead Counsel to the consortium of investors
which infused $3.625 billion into Long-Term Capital Management, L.P.
[hereinafter "LTCM"] in September, 1998.
1. On September 23, 1998, with the encouragement of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, fifteen major banks injected $3.625 billion into
LTCM, a private investment fund engaged in highly leveraged securities
transactions based on advanced mathematical models, to prevent its collapse
and potential default on an estimated $125 billion it had borrowed on $2.2
billion in capital. See Anita Raghavan & Mitchell Pacelle, To the Rescue? A
Hedge Fund Falters,so the Fed PersuadesBig Banks to Ante Up; Firms to Lend
$3.6 Billion as Long-Term CapitalLoses on its Bond Bets, WALL ST. J., Sep. 24,
1998 at Al (reporting on an "extraordinary gathering" in which the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York persuaded large banks to invest over $3.5 billion
in LTCM in return for a 90% ownership stake, and to prevent a financial crisis
should it unwind its positions); Steven Mufson, What Went Wrong? Fund'sBig

Bettors Learnedthat Risk Trumps Math, History, WASH. POST, Sep. 27, 1998, at
H1 (corrected Sep. 29, 1998) (listing fourteen major banks and institutions
which invested a total of $3.6 billion); Steven Syre, Fleet, BankBoston in
Syndicate Backing Troubled Hedge Fund, BosToN GLOBE, Sep. 26, 1998, at F1
(reporting that Fleet Financial Group had loaned $25 million to LTCM as part
of the bail-out); Joseph Kahn & Peter Truell, Troubled Investment Fund'sBets
Now Estimated at $1.25 Trillion, N.Y. TMns, Sep. 26, 1998, at Al (citing
financiers' estimates that LTCM had leveraged borrowings of $125 billion into
$1.25 trillion in open trading positions). For comprehensive information on

LTCM's background and near-collapse, see Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads
Cracked;N.Y. Tmns, Jan. 24, 1999, § 6, at 24; Carol J. Loomis, A House Built
on Sand, FoRTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998, at 110; Michael Siconolfi, Anita Raghavan &
Mitchell Pacelle, All Bets are Off: How the Salesmanship and Brainpower
Failedat Long-Term Capital;WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,1998, at Al.
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constraints prohibit me from discussing its details or what I did.
Therefore, unfortunately, notwithstanding hundreds of calls from

the press over the last few months, I have nothing to say about
LTCM.
That being said, I have been in the hedge fund business for
many, many years. I have worked with an awful lot of managers
on both sides of the street, from representing the sponsors who
organize the funds, to the Wall Street firms who place them and.
facilitate their trading of derivative products. Therefore, I know
all the agreements. I think that there are a few useful things that
relate to what has happened in the markets and the calls for more
regulation of hedge funds and derivatives.
CROSS-DEFAULT PRovIsIoNs

In the global financial system that exists today, there is
hardly a loan or swap agreement that does not have a crossdefault provision. Therefore, every enterprise that enters into
multiple master swap agreements, credit facilities or any other
form of financial relationship with multiple counter-parties,
accepts a cross-default provision on virtually every agreement it
enters into. These provisions basically state that, "If you default
on any agreement with any other party, you also default on this
agreement and must immediately settle up." ISDA swaps 2 and
other collateralized arrangements generally do not provide for
net settlement. Instead, each trade has collateral that is priced
separately upon default, based on a pricing regime embedded in
the agreement that assumes the availability of rational quotes.

Thus, if an investor defaulted on a bank loan, then it would also
default on the reported many thousands of other transactions
that this enterprise had been engaged in. The entire financial
system would then have to settle everything immediately during a
period of illiquidity and pricing difficulties.

2. "ISDA swaps" refers to swap transactions executed in conformity with
standard contractual documentation developed and maintained by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association [hereinafter ISDA]. See

ISDA, Overview of the ISDA Organization (last visited Sept. 3, 1999)
<http://isda.org/ala.html> (summarizing the objectives of the ISDA).
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I believe that the crux of the additional regulation and
systemic risk issues is the cross-default clause. It should be
inconsequential if you default on one agreement, when you have,
for example, $150 billion in assets, because the remaining
agreements should continue to operate normally. But, because
the system is now designed so that if you default on any
agreement, you automatically default on every agreement with
every other counter-party, the global financial system is interlinked and affected. A single default in the right place can rock
the system into a mad scramble to sell collateral at the worst time
with respect to each trade. The agreements do not provide a
mechanism for a portfolio windup; they only provide for a
transaction windup.
Unless you abolish cross-default clauses or modify them to
permit the orderly liquidation of a portfolio, you are unable to

control systemic risk. You can claim to reduce risk. You can

measure it in an infinite number of ways, from value-at-risk, 3 to
BIS4 standards, to any other measurement. Ultimately, that risk
will need to be internally controlled by the creditors, but the risk
to the system cannot be controlled. Some general level of risk
control may be obtained through some arbitrary measure. But
clever people who are not totally committed to controlling risk
within their own institutions will be able to comply with
guidelines, and still maintain virtually any level of risk, by going
off the reservation or truly off the balance sheet.

3. Value-at-risk [hereinafter VAR] is a type of sophisticated riskmanagement model used by banks to estimate the amount of given portfolio

loss they are likely to incur over a given period of time. See The Risk Business,
EcONoMST, Oct. 17, 1998, at 21, 23 (discussing VAR modeling and its

vulnerabilities). See also Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 62 Fed.
Reg. 68,064, 68,064-65 (1998) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, 208, 225 & 325
as amended by 64 Fed. Reg. 19,034 (1999)) (explaining how institutions use
VAR calculations in connection with regulatory capital standards).

4. "BIS standards" refers to risk measurement standards developed and
published by the Bank for International Settlements [hereinafter BIS].
Information on the BIS and its publications can be obtained from its website,

at <http://www.bis.org>.
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THE EvENTs WHICH LED TO MARKET ILLIQULDITY
I agree with Leon Metzger and Walter Weiner,5 in terms of
their views of the sequence of events and how the cycling-down
and overall panic resulted in the market illiquidity. The core
problem is that when there are no buyers and only sellers, or,
only buyers without sellers in any market, it is not a true market
anymore.
I believe that there is no need for any fundamental
regulatory changes, because the firms and the hedge funds have
taken steps since October to better control their risk. Regulation

cannot create markets; only buyers and sellers can create
markets.
When you have a panic that creates total iliquidity, and price
spreads where a single trade moves an entire market, the
problem is not of a regulatory nature, but of a psychological
nature. You cannot stop a panic. If you are in front of the herd,
you had better get out of the way. You are not going to change
their minds when their only concern is to protect their own
institutions' level of exposure. They cannot worry about the
market because they must worry about their own firms.
I do not think that any regulation would have prevented the
market panic. Even if all of the world's financial centers had
created a cohesive structure that overcame the secrecy issues and
differences in regulatory approach that inhibit transparency, a
market panic could not have been prevented.
In a way, it was very positive that so much attention was
focused on LTCM. The public did not realize that while LTCM
was a huge player, it was hardly alone. Therefore, the public
believed that everything was okay when the private market was
perceived to have corrected LTCM's problem.
The
professionals, however, were still extremely worried.
The
structural problems and the spreads did not immediately revert to
normal levels. Thus, it was very positive that everyone focused

5. See Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundationfor
Global Market Crises: Hedge Funds, supra at 5, 12-13; Walter H. Weiner,
Recent Market Events and the Foundation for Global Market Crises: The
Experience of Republic NationalBank, supra at 17,21-22.
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on this one entity. The public perception was that since LTCM
was fixed, the market was fixed.
Paracelsus, the famous alchemist, said that if you take
anything in a large enough dose, it becomes a poison. A lot of
people describe derivatives as being loaded guns, but that is
completely silly. "Over-the-counter derivative" is just a term.
No one will complain if I do a highly leveraged over-the-counter
swap trade as a substitute for a classic currency arbitrage, where
you know that tomorrow the trade will make X dollars because
the two currencies are at a spread and the transaction is
leveraged. No one thinks of that transaction as something to
worry about. But it is a swap, it is a derivative, it is leveraged,
and it is over-the-counter.
The real question is how to decide the level at which risk
becomes poison. It is a truism that if you want to make money,
you must take risk, and the greater the risk, the greater the
potential return. If you want to invest in low risk securities, such
as money market funds or AAA-rated securities, which the
whole world could do, you will have much less risk and the
concomitant rewards.
Hedge fund managers, in my experience, are very
sophisticated professionals. They are very much like their
brethren in the Wall Street firms and the banks, which is where
most of them began their careers. They all understand each
other and operate at very high levels. They raise capital from
people who trust them to manage it. The first rule of asset
management is don't give your money to somebody that you
don't trust. If you think that someone is untrustworthy or that
they may steal your money, you shouldn't give them a penny.
Hedge fund managers are highly professional and do the best
they can. The investors who give them money generally
understand the speculative nature of the investments.
This takes us to the interesting issue of regulation, which is
being played at a very high level. Regulators do not create a
market; the market participants create the market. Regulation
clearly has a place in the scheme. I would also argue that it is
appropriate and essential for regulators and regulated institutions
to work together in a cooperative way to preserve the
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marketplace. In this respect their interests are alike, and they are
not adversaries.
The regulators and the private market, in fact, got together
and the private market fixed itself without cost to the public. As
a result, people have learned many lessons. You could now
analyze this whole situation and conclude that the private market
works.
To my knowledge, there has been no credible claim or
allegation against any hedge fund of engaging in fraud or other
illegal or improper behavior as a result of this market turmoil. A
significant sum of money was lost, though not as a result of
criminal behavior or fraud, which people instinctively suspect
when there is a huge loss. However the risks of the marketplace

are real, and losses are incurred as a result of the risks that are
taken.
If there is any need of regulation, it is on the credit and
investment sides of already regulated entities such as brokerdealers and banks. There is no need to control the hedge funds
themselves. They consist of inherently opportunistic, private
capital that the investors can afford to lose. That is why the
offerings are private and the offering materials contain pages and
pages of disclosure that says, "You can lose all your money and
here are all the ways it can happen."
One of the topics that was on today's agenda was, "How do
you advise a hedge fund in times of market turmoil?" Lawyers
will find this somewhat distressing, but realistically there is no
adequate legal remedy even if your counter-party has improperly
raised its haircuts6 and is squeezing7 you to death, and you believe
that they have no right to hold the collateral that you need to pay
the margin call on the off-setting trade to avoid default.
Depending upon how the agreement was written, you may be
6. "Haircuts" refers to the "formulas used in the valuation of securities
for the purpose of calculating a broker-dealer's net capital." BARRON'S

DicoNARY OF FN. & INv. TERms 252 (5th ed. 1998). "The haircut varies
according to the class of a security, its market risk, and the time to maturity."
Id.
7. A "squeeze" in the investment industry refers to a "situation when
stocks or commodities futures start to move up in price, and investors who
have sold short are forced to cover their short positions in order to avoid large
losses." Id. at 584.
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correct. That is a very nice lawsuit. But the fund will be ancient
history and long forgotten by the time that lawsuit is ever
resolved or even well underway.
The only answer is to advise your clients to call in their
counter-parties' most senior business people to look at the
investment portfolio and make them comfortable that they do
not need to hold on to that money because your client is not
really as great a risk as they instinctively think. That is, increase
the transparency and data flow.
Absent that, little can be done. Many hedge funds were
terribly squeezed as a result of the process that Leon described.8
Haircuts went up and the funds needed immediate cash at a time
when many, many credit arrangements were being terminated.
There was a mad scramble for cash at the very moment that cash
was least available, and it all just kept feeding on itself.
RECENT CHANGES
My next topic is the changes that I have seen in both the
hedge funds and the counter-parties since last fall. I think that
these changes are, to a great degree, the response that cures the
problem. That is one of the reasons that the industry prefers to
deal with the problems themselves and is opposed to direct
regulation of hedge funds.
First, what you might consider "best industry practices" have

been ratcheted up a few notches. Counter-parties and creditors
already had high-level risk management, risk control personnel
and credit standards, and those standards are being tightened.
Risk managers who already had very significant authority have
gained even more, especially in the reputable institutions that are
genuinely committed to controlling risk. In my experience those
are virtually all of the institutions.
Overall, there has been a reduction in credit to hedge funds.
Just as the dealer books were reduced, the leverage that hedge
funds were permitted to use has generally become more
restricted. There is simply less capital available for them.
8. See Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundationfor
GlobalMarket Crises: Hedge Funds, supra at 5, 10-13.
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On the hedge fund side, the funds have all made great efforts
to become more transparent to their counter-parties. As long as
the funds have reasonable comfort that their counter-parties will
not trade against their own positions because those counterparties have reasonable Chinese walls9 protecting the
information, the hedge funds have. become much more
comfortable providing their risk analysis, their positions, and
virtually anything else that their counter-parties want.
In fact, I understand that there is one fund that opened its
own password protected website. The credit departments of its
counter-parties can log on whenever they want, at any time
during the day or night, and see in real-time what the fund is
doing. I am not sure that this is appropriate, or even necessary,
for everyone. But, to the extent that you are dealing with
psychology and comfort levels, the fact is that when creditors get
nervous, their initial reaction is to try to pull the money back. To
the extent that the information provided can resolve the anxiety,
it is very effective.
I think that the level of risk that can be taken by the
institution must ultimately be controlled by the institution. There
are plenty of external standards out there that entities, especially
the international banks, must follow. The entities do adhere to
those risk standards. Think about the structures that are already

in place to ensure safe and sound practices for banks and brokerdealers. Combine this with the fact that most of these are public
companies whose managers have personally invested in the stock.
Management likes their stock to go up, not down. Negative
publicity is detrimental to their own personal portfolios.
Therefore, everyone's incentives are oriented toward taking less
risk or really understanding the risks.

9. The term "Chinese wall" refers to internal controls used to prevent the
transfer of certain sensitive information from the investment, corporate
finance and research departments of brokerage houses to the sales and
brokerage departments, as necessary to comply with the securities laws against
insider trading. BARRON's DIcboNARY oF FiN. AND INv. TmRms 94 (5th ed.

1998).
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As Leon said, the models have also been adjusted."0 This is
perhaps no longer a rare event. The institutions are still
protecting against significant volatility and keeping more powder
dry, but all the structural incentives are already in place to try to
control these problems in the future.
I think, as an anecdote, that there were a tremendous
number of people up until last September who viewed some of
this quantitative analysis and the people who practiced it in
almost a religious light. Walter used the word "mesmerized,""
but it wasn't just the counter-parties who were mesmerized. A
very strong belief in these mathematical theories has developed
over the last few years. As the people at MIT and other places
have developed ever more sophisticated models, they were
perceived as infallible, notwithstanding the nod given to its
inherent limitations.
I know someone very well who really understands the
mathematics. When that person heard that LTCM was basically
melting down, he actually broke down and cried because he had
such faith in the mathematical modeling. It was a personally and
emotionally painful experience for him.
To a greater or lesser degree, notwithstanding the coldhearted cost-benefit analysis that Wall Street is so famous for, I
think everyone had that same faith in the quantitative analysis to
some degree, which will now have to re-prove itself. But, the
counter-parties have learned a significant lesson; they will now
accept less on faith and act more conservatively in the future.

10. Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundationfor Global
Market Crises:Hedge Funds, supra at 5,13.
11. Walter H. Weiner, Recent Market Events and the Foundation for
Global Market Crises: The Experience of Republic NationalBank, supra at 17,

Notes and Observations

